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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SHORELINES MANAGEMENT-JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW OF SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD DECISIONS-Department of
Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge No. 827, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 527 P.2d
1121 (1974).
Appellant, a fraternal lodge owning a parcel of real estate including
tidelands on Shilshole Bay in Seattle, Washington, applied to the City
for a substantial development permit pursuant to requirements of the
Washington Shoreline Management Act (SMA).1 The initial applica-
tion proposed an over-the-water lodge building, constructed entirely
on filled tideland, exceeding the SMA's 35-foot height restriction.2 A
second, modified application reduced the building's height, provided
an easement for public access to the water's edge, and proposed con-
struction of the lodge building over the water on pilings rather than on
filled tidelands. The area selected for construction was one of rela-
tively heavy commercial and high-density residential development.3
The City, acting on the later application, granted a conditional permit
that substantially altered the lodge's plan.4 Pursuant to the appeal
provisions of the SMA,5 the lodge thereupon sought review by the
Shorelines Hearings Board (Board). The review was duly certified,
with the State Department of Ecology, (DOE) and the Attorney Gen-
eral intervening in support of the conditional permit. After receiving
evidence, hearing arguments of counsel, and viewing the premises, the
Board issued an order directing the City of Seattle to grant a permit
less restrictive than the City's conditional permit. 6
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.010 etseq. (1974).
2. Id. § 90.58.320.
3. See 84 Wn. 2d 551, 552, 527 P.2d 1121, 1122. The parcel was sandwiched be-
tween developments that included a restaurant and a marina on one side and an eight-
story condominium building on the other. Id.
4. The lodge's primary objection was to the City's condition that the building be
constructed entirely above the line of mean high tide. WASH. ST. ENV. RPTR., S.H.B.
No. 22, at 1 (1972).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180 (1974).
6. The Board's order modified the lodge's permit to allow partial over-the-water
construction "on pilings southeastward only to an extension of a line drawn 151.5
degrees true from the southwestern corner of the L-shaped pier at the southern end
of the Port of Seattle Shilshole Marina." WASH. ST. ENV. RPTR., S.H.B. No. 22, at
5 (1972). This line, which the Board established to "confine to. the north and east
all present land fills and buildings on properties for a distance of 0.6 nautical miles
southeastward along the eastern shore of the ship channel," id. at 3, was viewed by
respondents as setting a line of conformity with the seaward projection of adjacent
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The DOE and the Attorney General sought superior court review
of this decision.7 Upon review of the Shorelines Hearings Board rec-
ord, the superior court reversed the Board's decision and reinstated
the City's conditional permit 8 on the ground that the Board's findings
were "clearly erroneous in view of the entire record . . . and the
public policy contained in the Shoreline Management Act. . . ."9 On
appeal, the state supreme court reversed and reinstated the findings,
conclusions, and order of the Shorelines Hearings Board. Held: Under
the unique circumstances of the case, the Board's decision was not
"clearly erroneous."' 0 Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge
No. 827, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974).
The Ballard Elks case involved a number of potential environ-
mental and coastline management issues; 1 but the true import of the
supreme court's decision lies in its treatment of the procedural aspects
of the SMA. The DOE, which has statewide responsibility for admin-
istering the SMA, attempted to show that the Shorelines Hearings
Board had, contrary to legal mandate, failed to give due weight to the
City's decision and to the consensus between the City and the DOE
regarding the desirability of the conditions placed on the permit. The
lodge, on the other hand, argued that the Shorelines Hearings Board
should have the primary role in reviewing permit decisions under the
SMA and that great deference should be paid to its expertise. This
note will show that, judged against the accepted standards of judicial
review of administrative decisions and in light of the appeal procedure
set forth in the SMA itself, the latter view is the appropriate one.
buildings, which had no basis in state shoreline law. Brief for Respondents at 27-28.
Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks Lodge No. 827, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 527 P.2d
1121 (1974).
7. The City of Seattle did not join the petition for review. 84 Wn. 2d 551. 554.
527 P.2d 1121, 1123.
8. WASH. ST. ENV. RPTR., S.H.B. No. 22, at 9 (1972).
9. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1974). See Part IV-A infra.
10. Subsumed under the general holding were the following component rulings:
(1) that findings of the Shorelines Hearings Board are to be reviewed by applying the
clearly erroneous standard at both the superior court and appellate court levels; (2)
that upon appeals from a superior court review of an administrative action, an ap-
pellate court should apply the clearly erroneous test directly against the administra-
tive action in question; and (3) that a reviewing court should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the Board. Additionally, the court interpreted the policy of the
Shoreline Management Act as permitting at least some future shoreline development.
so long as the development is "carefully planned, managed, and coordinated in keep-
ing with the public interest." 84 Wn. 2d at 557, 527 P.2d at 1125.
11. See note 30 and accompanying text infra.
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I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The Washington State Shoreline Management Act was adopted by
the state legislature in 197112 in the midst of controversy and by a
somewhat unusual procedure. 13 The stated purposes adopted and
embodied in the SMA are "to provide for the management of the
shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and
appropriate uses," and to promote a policy of "protecting against ad-
verse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wild-
life, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting
generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incident
thereto. 14 "[R] ecognizing and protecting private property rights
consistent with the public interest ' 15 was also acknowledged to be an
important aim of coordinated shoreline planning.
In broad outline, the SMA contemplates the following process for
state shorelines management:' 6 Local governments prepare "master
programs"'17 in accordance with DOE "guidelines."' 8 Once properly
formulated and approved, the various master programs constitute "use
regulations" for the state's shorelines,' 9 and substantial development
12. For a detailed summary of the history of the SMA see SHORELINES MANAGE-
MENT: THE WASHINGTON EXPERIENCE 19-44 (Proceedings of a Symposium spon-
sored by the Environmental Quality Committee, Young Lawyers Section, American
Bar Ass'n, June 24, 1972). For closer analysis of the SMA as a whole see Crooks,
The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Crooks].
13. In enacting this environmental protection law, the legislature responded to
pressure from two widely variant forces: the burgeoning environmental movement in
the state, especially the impetus of the Washington Environmental Council; and, the
Washington Supreme Court, in its controversial decision concerning fill on the fluc-
tuating shores of Lake Chelan. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232
(1969). See Crooks at 425-28.
The SMA was submitted to Washington voters on the November 1972 election bal-
lot in the form of two initiatives: Initiative 43, sponsored primarily by the Washing-
ton Environmental Council; and Initiative 43B, enacted by the legislature as an al-
ternative to Initiative 43 and placed on the ballot for voter approval after its effec-
tive date. See Crooks at 424 n.7. Although these proposals differed in a number of
important respects, probably the most significant difference was the degree to which
control over the state's shorelines was centralized-Initiative 43 would have granted
substantial power to the state Department of Ecology, while 43B allowed greater
local control. Washington voters approved the concept of shorelines management
and selected Ilitiative 43B to implement it.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1974).
15. Id.
16. For an analysis of the SMA's categorization of shorelines of the state see
Crooks, supra note 12.
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(b) (1974).
18. Id. § 90.58.030(3)(a).
19. Id. § 90.58.100(1).
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permits20 will issue for projects conforming to the uses permitted by
the area's master program. In the interim period before a local master
program has been adopted, substantial development permit applica-
tions are to be measured against "(i) The policy of RCW 90.58.020;
and (ii) after their adoption, the guidelines and regulations of the de-
partment; and (iii) so far as can be ascertained, the master programs
being developed for the area."2 ' The Department of Ecology monitors
local administration of the SMA, and, during this period, the DOE or
the Attorney General may seek review in the same manner as under
R.C.W. § 90.58.180,22 which sets forth the appeal provisions of the
SMA as a whole.
After the interim period the appeals procedure begins with review
by a "shorelines hearings board sitting as a quasi-judicial
body .... ,,23 Review may be sought by "any person aggrieved by the
granting or denying of a permit on shorelines of the state"24 by filing a
request within thirty days of the final order.2 5 In addition to "any
20. Id. § 90.58.030(3)(d), (e); § 90.58.140. Although the question of what con-
stitutes "substantial development" will doubtless be the subject of future litigation, it
is beyond the scope of this note.
21. Id. § 90.58.140(2)(a).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140 (2)(a) (1974) seemed to indicate that during
the interim period review could be sought only by the DOE and then only if initiated
within 30 days. However, in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn. 2d
441, 536 P.2d 157 (1975), the supreme court held that since WASH. REV. CODE §
90.58.180 (1974) governs all permit appeals, review in this interim period could be
sought by either the DOE or the Attorney General, or both, during the 45-day time
limit set for post-master plan appeal.
In Hama Hama, a permit had been granted by the county, and both the DOE and
the Attorney General appealed to the Shorelines Hearings Board. The county obtained
a writ of certiorari from the Thurston County Superior Court to review the Board's
failure to dismiss the appeal, and the superior court ordered dismissal on the ground
that the DOE's appeal had been untimely. In holding that the 45-day limit of §
90.58.180(2) applied, the supreme court reasoned that a liberal construction of the
SMA required an expansive reading of its appeals provisions-inadequate time for re-
view might thwart the policies of the SMA. Moreover, where statutory ambiguity is
found, interpretations by the administrative body or bodies charged with administer-
ing the law are given great, although not controlling, weight. Thus it was significant
that both the DOE and the Board had interpreted the SMA to allow 45 days for ap-
peal, even in the pre-master plan period.
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.170 (1974). The Board consists of "six members:
Three members shall be members of the pollution control hearings board; two mem-
bers, one appointed by the association of Washington cities and one appointed by the
association of county commissioners, both serving at the pleasure of the associations;
and the state land commissioner or his designee. The chairman of the pollution con-
trol hearings board shall be the chairman of the shorelines hearings board." Id.
24. Id. § 90.58.180(1).
25. Id. A request for review must be filed with the DOE and with the State At-
torney General, one of which must certify to the Board within 30 days of receipt that
408
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person aggrieved," the DOE or the State Attorney General may obtain
review of 26
any final order granting a permit, or granting or denying an applica-
tion for a permit issued by a local government by filing a written re-
quest with the shorelines appeals board and the appropriate local gov-
ernment within forty five days from the date the final order was filed as
provided in subsection (5) of RCW 90.58.140..
Finally, appeals from the grant or denial of a permit are made subject
to the provisions of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act
(WAPA)27 pertaining to procedures in contested cases;28 judicial re-
view of Shorelines Hearings Board proceedings is also subject to
WAPA requirements.2 9
the requestor has valid reasons to seek review. This latter requirement is a condition
precedent to review by the Board, but failure to obtain certification is specifically
stated not to preclude superior court review "under any right to review otherwise
available to the requestor." Id. What this may mean in terms of provision for alter-
nate routes of review has not yet been judicially determined. A strained interpretation
of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA) could conceivably result
in deliberate sidestepping of the Shorelines Hearings Board.
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(1) (1974) provides that "any person aggrieved by a
final decision in a contested case.., is entitled to judicial review thereof .... The
decision to grant or deny a permit is a final order because it comes within the defini-
tion of "contested case" in id. § 34.04.010(3), i.e., a proceeding before an agency in
which an opportunity for a hearing is required by law or constitution prior or subse-
quent to determination of rights, duties, privileges, etc., of the parties. The definition
also includes "licensing," which might encompass permit decisions, since subsection
4 of that provision defines a license as, among other things, permission required by
law to engage in an activity.
Several Washington cases indicate that such sidestepping would incur doctrinal
problems. In Sunny Brook Farms v. Omdahl, 42 Wn. 2d 788, 259 P.2d 383 (1953),
the Washington Supreme Court held that under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine,
where an adequate administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be
sought thereunder before a court will act. In a subsequent case the court again held
that administrative remedies must be exhausted before courts will intervene. State
ex rel. Ass'n of Washington Indus. v. Johnson, 56 Wn. 2d 407, 353 P.2d 881 (1960).
A variation on this theme is the "primary jurisdiction" rule, which applies whenever
enforcement of a claim requires resolution of issues that, under the regulatory scheme
in question, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body
so that the judicial process is suspended pending referral of issues to the administra-
tive body. Schmidt v. Old Union Stockyards Co., 58 Wn. 2d 478, 364 P.2d 23 (1961).
It is therefore difficult to imagine how one could frame a shorelines question so as to
avoid going through the Board. Moreover, if a party so attempted and thereby ex-
ceeded the 30-day limit for filing an appeal with the Board he might be estopped from
asserting the claim at a later point. See generally F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 586 (1965) [hereinafter cited as COOPER].
26. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(2) (1974). Master programs and guidelines,
inter alia, are also appealable under § 90.58.180; however, this procedure differs sub-
stantially from permit appeals, and is outside the scope of this note.
27. Id. ch. 34.04(1974). See note 25 supra.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(3) (1974).
29. Id.
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II. THE BALLARD ELKS LODGE LITIGATION
It is against this statutory background and framework that the Bal-
lard Elks litigation must be considered. At the time of the lodge's ini-
tial application, no master program had been established for Seattle,
so only the SMA's general policy and the DOE's guidelines were avail-
able to measure the merits of the lodge's request. At issue in the litiga-
tion were both the substantive and procedural aspects of the SMA. 30
Controversy over the substantive law necessarily focused on the policy
articulated in R.C.W. § 90.58.020, specifically those portions of the
stated policy dealing with "shorelines of the state."3 ' The substantive
question can be broken down into two parts: Does the law permit
30. Somewhat less obviously at issue was whether the shoreline in question was a
"natural" shoreline. The DOE contended that it was (Brief for Respondents at 2), and
although the lodge never claimed that the shoreline seaward of the mean high water
mark had been altered, nevertheless they stressed that the landivard portions of the
property had been filled (Brief for Appellants at 4). In its decision, the supreme court
took note of the description of the parcel as "altered," thereby leaving unclear whether
the decision treated natural shorelines or only shorelines existing in some non-natural
condition. 84 Wn. 2d 551, 552, 527 P.2d 1121, 1122. If the importance of the decision
stems from its clarification of the scope of judicial review of Board decisions, the na-
tural or altered state of a shoreline for purposes of the SMA should not be determina-
tive.
Ultimately, however this question must be resolved. This note contends that the
SMA was meant to cover developed as well as undeveloped areas; natural as well as
altered shorelines. The policy statement governing "shorelines of the state," see note
31 infra, however, does appear to place natural shorelines in a preferred position, al-
lowing the inference that altered shorelines receive less consideration. Moreover, fre-
quent references in Ballard Elks to the use priorities governing "alterations of the na-
tural condition of the shorelines of the state" (WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1974))
might suggest that the court did, in fact, regard the lodge's parcel as an example of
natural shoreline. If so, the supreme court's holding that the Shorelines Hearings
Board did not err in allowing development by a private club on a natural shoreline
could portend similar further development, unless, as it arguably should, the court
would find no error in a denial by the Board of a permit under similar conditions.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1974) provides:
It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the shorelines
of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses.
This policy is designed to insure the development of these shorelines in a man-
ner which, while allowing for limited reduction of rights of the public in the
navigable waters, will promote and enhance the public interest. This policy con-
templates protecting againt adverse effects to the public health, the land and its
vegetation and wildlife, id the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while
protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental
thereto.
..'. Alterations of the natural condition of the shorelines of the state, in those
limited instances when authorized, shall be given priority for single family resi-
dences, ports, shoreline recreational uses including but not limited to parks, ma-
rinas, piers, and other improvements facilitating public access to shorelines of
the state, industrial and commercial developments which are particularly depen-
410
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development of shorelines, and, if so, what uses are permitted? To the
first part of the question, the Washington court gave an unqualified
"yes"; the resolution of the second aspect remains primarily the re-
sponsibility of the Shorelines Hearings Board.
A. Is Construction Permitted?
The Department of Ecology contended that one of the key concepts
in Washington shorelines law is that over-the-water construction is
strongly discouraged. 32 Yet, as the court pointed out, the SMA itself
contemplated "some future and additional development along shore-
lines in the state, including over-the-water construction, and
. . . [did] not purport to totally prohibit such development. '3 3 Al-
though the DOE never contended that the SMA prohibited all devel-
opment on state shorelines, in response to appellants' contention that
"the policy of the Shoreline Management Act is of at least dubious
application because the shoreline in that area had been previously al-
tered by man,"34 it argued strongly that the SMA's policy did apply to
the land in question. It is clear from the court's decision, however,
that development is permissible if coordinated and planned in keeping
with both public and private interests. The language of the SMA,
moreover, clearly supports this view.35
B. What Uses Are Permitted?
A close reading of the Ballard Elks decision indicates that the
Washington Supreme Court has decided to defer answering the second
part of the previously posed question and instead content itself with
dent on their location on- or use of the shorelines of the state and other develop-
ment that will provide an opportunity for substantial numbers of the people to
enjoy the shorelines of the state.
32. Brief for Respondents at 18-21.
33. 84 Wn. 2d at 557, 527 P.2d at 1125.
34. Brief for Appellants at 24.
35. The SMA is replete with references to shoreline development. E.g., WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.58.020 (1974), states that unrestricted shoreline construction is not
in the best public interest; that the harm lies in uncoordinated and piecemeal develop-
ment. The same section states the legislature's intention to insure development in a
manner that will promote the public interest. Indeed, the substantial development




reviewing Board decisions. As the closing paragraph of the opinion
aptly expresses:36
Given the unique factual situation here existing, we are satisfied the
Shorelines Hearings Board, acting within the scope of its authority
and expertise, appropriately considered the practical realities per-
taining to the existing shoreline, the policy of RCW 90.58, and the
relevant guidelines in arriving at its decision. We cannot, therefore,
find its decision to be "clearly erroneous."
The phrases "unique factual situation" and "not 'clearly erroneous' "
indicate not that the court would necessarily have decided as did the
Board, but only that the Board, in the court's view, was not clearly
mistaken.
The former phrase strongly suggests that this decision is to be lim-
ited to its facts and that no generalization can be drawn from the
granting of the permit for over-the-water construction by the appel-
lants. In reaching its conclusion, the court stressed no less than six
major and three minor factual findings of the Board relating to the lat-
ter's decision.37 Both the Board and the court also considered addi-
tional factors that may have favored the lodge, including the fact that
it had owned the property and planned the clubhouse long before the
effective date of the SMA. It would, therefore, be inaccurate to con-
clude from the Ballard Elks decision that a fraternal lodge building is
one of the favored uses permitted on shorelines of the state by the
Shoreline Management Act.
36. 84 Wn. 2d at 559, 527 P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added).
37. The court stated:
In support of its decision, the board found, and the evidence sustains its find-
ings, that: (1) many of the existing adjacent developments and structures are
not water-dependent uses as defined in RCW 90.58; (2) navigation over appel-
lant's tidelands was de minimus [sic]; (3) structural interference with view would
be minor; (4) appellant's building over the water would not significantly affect
public health, wild or aquatic life, shoreline environment, or public use of the
water; (5) the proposed construction would provide an opportunity for sub-
stantial numbers of people to enjoy the shoreline; and (6) no public or local
protest had been registered in opposition to the proposed structure. In addition.
the board noted that to restrict appellant's structure to dry land would: (a) sig-
nificantly and adversely diminish the area available for off-street vehicular park-
ing; (b) preclude usage of a narrow spit of dry land extending seaward along
the northern boundary of the property; and (c) inhibit the scenic view of pa-
trons of the proposed clubhouse.
84 Wn. 2d at 559. 527 P.2d at 1126.
412
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III. SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD-THE AGENCY
REVIEWED
The decision in Ballard Elks has clarified and defined the relation-
ships among the Department of Ecology, local entities, the Shorelines
Hearings Board, and reviewing courts under the SMA. The DOE con-
tended that the Shorelines Hearings Board, in passing on whether the
City's imposed conditions to the permit would be upheld, should have
given great weight to the City's objectives and interpretation of the
SMA's application. 38 The court, however, apparently did not seriously
consider the possibility that the agency to be reviewed should have
been the City, i.e., that the administrative action under review oc-
curred at the local level. Had such an interpretation been adopted, the
Shorelines Hearings Board and subsequent reviewing courts might
have been bound to apply the clearly erroneous standard to the City's
decision to grant or deny the permit. Such a scheme might have com-
ported more closely with the local-control paradigm of the SMA, and
certainly would have suited the DOE's purpose in this controversy.
However, a local-entity-as-agency scheme would greatly discomfit the
DOE when conflicts between it and a local body arose. Were the
Board required to review a local decision by the clearly erroneous
standard, the relative weight of the DOE's views would be corre-
spondingly diminished.
The Department of Ecology further believed that the structure set
up by the SMA was such that where a local entity and the DOE were
in agreement concerning a substantial development permit, an expres-
sion of such agreement should be determinative, i.e., binding on the
Board and reviewing courts. The DOE characterized the relationship
thusly: "The administrative scheme established by the SMA casts local
government in the role of administrator, the Department of Ecology
as policemen, and the Shorelines Hearings Board as referee of dis-
38. Brief for Respondents at 9-14, 32-33. Respondents argued that support for
this contention could be found in both the language of the SMA and the state-local
balance intended by Washington voters in choosing Initiative 43B over the Washing-
ton Environmental Council version, Initiative 43. The legislative expression of this
balance gave local government the "primary responsibility for initiating and adminis-
tering the regulatory program" of the SMA. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (1974).
Local entities would develop master programs in accordance with SMA policy and
have primary responsibility for grant or denial of substantial development permits.
413
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putes." 39 Under this view, where no dispute exists between a local en-
tity and the DOE, the Shorelines Hearings Board has no function.
This view ignores the importance of the role played by the Board in
the instant case as a forum for review initiated by an aggrieved private
party.
The appellant's procedural interpretation was quite different. It
characterized the Shorelines Hearings Board as the policymaking
body under the SMA and virtually ignored the role of the DOE.
40
Presumably, the denigration of the DOE's role by the appellant re-
flected its desire to preserve the Board's favorable finding by con-
vincing the supreme court to defer to the expertise of that state
agency. Neither the statute nor its legislative history fully supports this
view, however.41 Local governments were clearly intended to play a
39. Brief for Respondents at 9-10. Limited support for this position, with respect
to the DOE supervision of policies formulated at the local level, may be found in
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050 (1974), which provides:
This chapter establishes a cooperative program of shoreline management between
local government and the state. Local government shall have the primary re-
sponsibility for initiating and administering the regulatory program of this chap-
ter. The department shall act primarily in a supportive and review capacity with
primary emphasis on insuring compliance with the policy and provisions of this
chapter.
40. A sampling of the assertions in appellants' brief clearly illustrates this point.
For example, appellants contended: "The Shoreline [sic] Hearings Board must con-
sider statewide policies and attempt to make a statewide plan .. " Brief for Appel-
lants at 32. "The final determination at the administrative level as to whether or not
a permit should be issued was . . . left to the State through the Shoreline [sic] Hear-
ings Board .. " Id. at 32. "The determination of whether or not the public's right to
use navigable waters may be invaded, and the extent of the invasion allowed, is left
to the Shoreline [sic] Hearings Board." Id. at 16. In this view, little weight should
be given to the decision of the local agency, and none at all to that of the Department
of Ecology.
41. The legislative history of the SMA can be characterized as favoring the DOE's
view. The respective degree of state control over shorelines in both initiatives pro-
posed, see note 13 supra. was a major issue in the 1972 election campaign, and the
state's voters were presumably aware of this difference. The Washington official vot-
ers pamphlet for 1972 (prepared by the Secretary of State) indicated this difference.
The supporters of Initiative 43B stated therein:
The principal difference between Initiative 43 and the Shoreline Management
Act 43B, lies in the delegation of responsibility. Initiative 43 gives the State con-
trol while the City and County governments have the major role under 43B.
Local governments are more likely to formulate decisions and provide the
flexibility necessary in resolving critical questions within their jurisdictions than
the State government. The Department of Ecology acts more as a supervisory
and review agency maintaining consistency in the implementation of the Act.
OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET at 34. Opponents of Initiative 43B also treated the major
difference between the two proposals as state versus local control: "[Initiative 43B]
allows local officials to perform the function of permit issuing and enforcement sub-
ject to overruling by State authorities." Id. at 35.
414
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significant role in the process,4 and the Board was expressly estab-
lished to play a quasi-judicial, 43 not a policymaking, role.
Thus, three possible approaches vis-h-vis the concept of an "agen-
cy" decision could have been taken by the court: First, that the local
body was an agency, to be reviewed by all bodies in accordance with
the clearly erroneous standard; second, that local-state agreement
constituted an agency decision, also to be given only limited review by
the board; and, last, that the quasi-judicial Shorelines Hearings Board
constituted the agency whose actions would be given limited review.
The supreme court regarded the Board as a reservoir of decisional
expertise, and, since the Board sits as an impartial administrative re-
view body and develops a reviewable record while local government
bodies often do not, it seemed likely that the court would choose the
third alternative, as it did. Adding the fact that the court had pre-
viously designated the Shorelines Hearings Board as an "agency" for
WAPA purposes,44 the court's failure to explain its choice is not sur-
prising.
IV. SCOPE OF REVIEW
A. The Clearly Erroneous Test
The importance of the Board in the SMA's administrative structure
was emphasized by the utilization of the standard of judicial review
applicable under the WAPA, 45 i.e., the "clearly erroneous" test.46
42. See notes 13 & 41 and accompanying text supra.
43. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.170 (1974) states: "A shorelines hearings board
sitting as a quasi judicial body is hereby established .... "
44. See Department of Highways v. King County Chapter, Wash. Environ. Coun-
cil, 82 Wn. 2d 280, 510 P.2d 216 (1973).
45. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1974).
46. "Clearly erroneous" as a standard for reviewing agency decisions was urged
as a substitute for the substantial evidence test by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in its 1961 revision of the Model State Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. See COOPER at 663 et seq. The clear error test, as it is sometimes
called, is said to be the same as that applied by an appellate court reviewing the find-
ings of a lower court sitting without a jury. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). In 1967,
Washington adopted the clearly erroneous standard in place of the substantial evi-
dence test. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1974); formerly Ch. 234, §
13(6)(e), [1959] Wash. Laws 1088.
For the historical case treatment of this test in Washington see Ancheta v. Daly, 77
Wn. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969) (explication of new clearly erroneous standard as
applied to unemployment compensation); Tunget v. Employment Security Dep't, 78
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Typically contrasted with the "substantial evidence" test,4 7 the clearly
erroneous test is characterized as providing the broader scope of judi-
cial review48 because, whereas the substantial evidence standard re-
Wn. 2d 954, 481 P.2d 436 (1971) (where trial court determines administrative deci-
sion clearly erroneous in view of the entire record, same record must be furnished to
appellate court); Newbury v. State Dep't of Public Assistance, 80 Wn. 2d 13, 491
P.2d 235 (1971) (cited in Farm Supply; although not directly analyzing the clearly
erroneous test, where trial court found department's denial of welfare benefits to have
been based on insufficient evidence, supreme court reversed on ground that substantial
evidence existed in record); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d
109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973) (although finding can be held clearly erroneous despite
supporting evidence, where testimony was uncontradicted concerning lowering of lake
level, no basis existed on which the trial court could have been left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake had been made); Farm Supply Distribs., Inc. v.
Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wn. 2d 446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974) (review-
ing court, as well as superior court, should apply clearly erroneous standard); Wil-
liams v. Young, 6 Wn. App. 494, 494 P.2d 508 (1972) (clearly erroneous test re-
quires review of entire record of decision of state Supervisor of Savings and Loan
Associations, including transcript of membership meeting of association); Depart-
ment of Ecology v. City of Kirkland, 8 Wn. App. 516, 508 P.2d 1030 (1973), aff'd,
84 Wn. 2d 25, 523 P.2d 1181 (1974) (where Board vote on substantial development
permit is split, decision deemed "final" for purpose of review; in order to have benefit
of board's expertise, trial court to review entire record in context of the findings of
the three board members who had voted to affirm permit grant); Willard v. Employ-
ment Security Dep't, 10 Wn. App. 437, 517 P.2d 973 (1974) (findings and conclu-
sions of administrative appeal tribunal correctly adopted by trial court in view of
clearly erroneous standard); Warmington v. Employment Security Dep't, 12 Wn. App.
364, 529 P.2d 1142 (1974) (trial court's reversal of state Employment Security Dep't
ruling affirmed after analysis of trial court's review, citing Ballard Elks).
With respect to review of judicial decisions see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364 (1948) (antitrust action). In U.S. Gypsum the Court explained that
clear error is found only when a "reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395. Def-
erence is given to the trial court's expertise in judging the demeanor of witnesses and
the overall context of the factual situation. Another opinion often relied upon by the
Washington court in construing the clearly erroneous standard is United States v.
Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). There, following dismissal of its
complaint by the trial court, the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court,
urging review, reversal, and remand. Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, char-
acterized this request as asking the Court to try the case de novo on the record and
fashion relief. Such a result, he said, would constitute too much review; a trial court,
sitting without a jury, is not to be reversed unless clearly erroneous. He further stated,
"[t] here is no case more appropriate for adherence to this rule [FED. R. Civ. P.
52(a)] than one in which the complaining party creates a vast record of cumulative
evidence as to long-past transactions, motives, and purposes, the effect of which de-
pends largely on credibility of witnesses." Id. at 332. This reluctance to review de
novo is reflected in the preference of most courts reviewing administrative decisions
for a record-making tribunal. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
§§ 29.02,-.06,-.08 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS].
47. Ch. 234, § 13(6)(e), [1959] Wash. Laws 1088, as amended WASH. REV.
CODE § 34.04.130 (1974), originally read: "unsupported by material and substantial
evidence in view of the entire record as submitted." Thus, the substantial evidence
test is no longer applied in judicial review of contested cases under the WAPA.
48. See Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969). See generally
DAVIS § 29.02, at 527-30; COOPER at 724-29.
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quires a court reviewing an administrative decision to affirm the agen-
cy's holding if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the decision, 49 the clearly erroneous test enables a decision to be re-
versed even if supported by substantial evidence where the reviewing
court finds the decision to be "clearly erroneous in view of the entire
record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the
legislature authorizing the decision or order." 50
The distinction between the two tests, although convenient and
clear in theory, tends to be blurred and difficult to apply when ac-
tually used by reviewing courts.51 In Washington, the problems of dis-
tinguishing the two tests are apparent. The earliest Washington Su-
preme Court construction of the test was in Ancheta v. Daly,52 an
appeal from a superior court judgment reversing the decision of the
commissioner and an appeal tribunal of the state Employment Secu-
rity Department. Claimants had been ruled ineligible for unemploy-
ment compensation. On appeal, the superior court ordered the com-
missioner to award immediate benefits. The department appealed to
the supreme court on the ground, among others, that the trial court
had applied the substantial evidence test rather than the newly man-
dated clearly erroneous test. Although agreeing that the wrong stan-
dard had been applied, because the test used below had been narrower
than the proper one, the court did not reverse. Thus, the court cor-
rectly understood the clearly erroneous test to allow for broader re-
view than the substantial evidence test. Unfortunately, subsequent
court opinions have confused the application of the two tests53 and,
49. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Transport Co. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n,
69 Wn. 2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966); State ex rel. Gunstone v. State Highway
Comm'n, 72 Wn. 2d 673, 434 P.2d 734 (1967).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1974).
51. See DAVIS § 29.02, at 527-30; COOPER at 726-29.
52. 77 Wn. 2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969).
53. In Newbury v. Department of Public Assistance, 80 Wn. 2d 13, 491 P.2d
235 (1971), for example, the court stated that since substantial evidence supported
the administrative decision, it should be upheld. In Stempel v. Department of Water
Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973), after stating the Ancheta test, the
court held that since uncontradicted testimony supported the agency's view, no basis
existed on which the trial court could have found the agency decision to be clearly
erroneous. More peculiarly, in the court's original opinion in Leschi Improvement
Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774(1974), the court, citing Ancheta, stated that administrative findings of fact are to be
judged by the substantial evidence test. Subsequently, on December 10, 1975, after its
decision in Ballard Elks, the court ordered the Leschi opinion amended to correct
statements it had made concerning judicial review of administrative findings under the
WAPA. One such amendment appears in 84 Wn. 2d at 282 of the bound volume.
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on occasion, have stated that the former is stricter.54
A related problem is which decision should be reviewed on appeal
from a superior court decision based on the WAPA,5 5 i.e., that of the
court or of the administrative body. The Washington court first
treated this problem in Farm Supply Distributors, Inc. v. Washington
Utilities & Transportation Commission.56 Farm Supply had applied to
the Washington Utilities Commission to operate as a contract carrier;
other carriers contested the application. Hearings were held, and the
hearing examiner recommended approval, but the commission re-
versed the examiner's decision and denied the permit. Farm Supply
appealed the commission's decision to the superior court, which re-
versed on the ground that the decision was clearly erroneous. On ap-
peal to Division III of the Washington Court of Appeals the superior
court decision was affirmed, the appeals court reasoning that, at the
Where the advance sheet version had cited numerous cases, including Ancheta, as
authority for its discussion of the substantial evidence standard, the amended version
cites only Ancheta and Farm Supply. In 84 Wn. 2d at 286 of the bound volume, in
place of language referring to the substantial evidence test, and reasoning from sev-
eral other earlier cases, the court, by order, substituted the following language:
Where the superior court has applied the "clearly erroneous" test in examining
administrative agency action on a writ of certiorari, on review the appellate
court stands in the same position as the superior court, and applies the same
test directly to the administrative action.
As authority, the court cited Farm Supply, but this language does not explicitly ap-
pear in the Farm Supply opinion. Similar language does, however, appear in Ballard
Elks. 84 Wn. 2d at 555, 527 P.2d at 1124. Neither case cites the other, presumably
for temporal reasons. Ballard Elks could not cite Leschi, because that portion of the
Leschi opinion had not yet been written in November 1974, when Ballard Elks was
announced. Leschi does not cite Ballard Elks even though the quoted passage could
well have been derived from Ballard Elks. One possible explanation for this break in
continuity is that the writer of the substituted passage desired not to cite to a Novem-
ber 1974 decision in an opinion that, in bound form, would appear to precede the
former. Note that the bound Pacific Reporter version of the Leschi opinion appears as
originally written, with the court's original discussion of the substantial evidence test.
527 P.2d at 1129 (1974).
54. Farm Supply Distribs., Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wn. 2d
446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974). See notes 56 & 59 and accompanying text infra.
55. Little help in analyzing this problem can be garnered elsewhere. The Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 6362,
7562 (1970), uses the substantial evidence standard, and no other state adopting the
Revised Model Act has dealt with the problem. See COOPER at 663 et seq. and Appen-
dix at 797 et seq. The Commissioners' comments to Section 15(g) of the Revised
Model Act note that the change was recommended by a Hoover Commission Task
Force and the American Bar Association Special Committee on Legal Services and
Procedure. The standard, the Commissioners explain, "do [es] not permit the court to
'weigh' the evidence, or to substitute its judgment on discretionary matters, but it does
permit setting aside 'clearly' erroneous decisions. Certainly a clearly erroneous decision
should not be permitted to stand." COOPER at 822.
56. 83 Wn. 2d 446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974).
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appellate level, the question was no longer whether the commission's
decision had been clearly erroneous, but rather whether the trial
court's holding to that effect was supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, the clearly erroneous test should be applied only at the
superior court level. A decision of Division II of the court of appeals,
however, had held to the contrary.57 The Washington Supreme Court,
thus required to face the issue, reversed Division III and held that the
clearly erroneous standard should be applied by courts at all levels.
Justice Stafford, writing for the court, reasoned that since there is
likely to be substantial evidence on both sides in a contested case, "if
either a trial or an appellate court limited its inquiry to whether there
was 'substantial evidence' it would be only a short step to ignoring the
deference that must be accorded the 'expertise' of the administrative
agency or to overlooking the 'public policy' factor that by law must be
considered."58 Moreover, "appellate courts stand in the same position
as the trial court when reviewing the decision of an administrative
agency." 59
Farm Supply, although suggesting the answer, did not settle the
question of which decision, the administrative or judicial, will be sub-
ject to the clearly erroneous standard of review by an appellate court.
An appellate court will have received the case from the court below,
not directly from an administrative body, and will review a decision of
the superior court or court of appeals on the agency decision, as well
as review the agency decision itself. Following the Farm Supply deci-
sion, it might still have been possible to argue that an appellate court
should review the superior court's decision according to the clearly
erroneous standard, rather than applying the standard directly to the
agency decision. Application of the clearly erroneous standard in this
manner would make the superior court's review nearly dispositive;
while for the appellate court to review the agency decision directly
57. Williams v. Young, 6 Wn. App. 494,494 P.2d 508 (1972).
58. 83Wn.2dat448,518P.2dat 1238.
59. Id. Note, however, that the opinion asserts that the clear error standard is
stricter than the substantial evidence test; i.e., more is required for the reversal of an
administrative decision than the "mere act of weighing the evidence differently than
did the Commission ...." 83 Wn. 2d at 449, 518 P.2d at 1238. The court stated
that "clearly erroneous" means that even though substantial evidence supports the
agency decision, the trial court must be left with the firm conviction that a mistake had
been made. Id. at 449, 518 P.2d at 1239.
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would reduce the impact of the superior court decision at later appel-
late levels. 60
In deciding which decision an appellate court should review, the
Ballard Elks court indicated: 61
Our principal task . . . is to review the entire record before us to de-
termine if the Shorelines Hearings Board order is "clearly erroneous"
in view of the public policy enunciated in the Shoreline Management
Act of 1971, RCW 90.58. If our evaluation of the record firmly con-
vinces us that a mistake has been made, then the Superior Court cor-
rectly applied the "clearly erroneous" test. If not, the Superior Court
did not.
The supreme court evidently intends a nearly de novo review of the
administrative record, a duplication of the work of the superior court.
It is this distinction, rather than that between "clearly erroneous" and
"substantial evidence" or that between the deference due the DOE as
opposed to that to be accorded the Board, that is critical to a second
review. Since the two tests tend to produce similar results62 (despite
60. The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that the superior court does
play a role distinct from that of an appellate court in some instances of review of ad-
ministrative decisions. For example, in Department of Highways v. King County
Chapter, Wash. Environ. Council, 82 Wn. 2d 280, 510 P.2d 216 (1973), the court had
to determine the proper court to review Shorelines Hearings Board decisions as spe-
cified by the SMA. In deciding that the legislature had intended appeals from the
Board to be taken to the superior courts, the court stressed that a forum at that level
could do a much more thorough, efficient job of reviewing administrative decisions
than could the court of appeals. Id. at 288, 510 P.2d at 221. Subsequent to this deci-
sion, WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(3) (1974) was amended to delete all references
to the formerly confusing incorporation of WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21B. Ch. 203,
§ 2, [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1564. The statute now provides that appeals
procedure should be governed solely by the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04.
A similar situation is presented by review of administrative determinations within
the framework of the State Environmental Procedures Act (SEPA), where the supreme
court has suggested that additional testimony might be taken at the trial level. See
Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271,
525 P.2d 774 (1974). Presumably SEPA litigation would frequently involve review-
ing decisions made by bodies very unlike courts, whose procedures may be subject to
challenge on appeal. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.010 et seq. (1974).
For example, such decisions will be made by zoning boards, city and county coun-
cils, or university boards of regents-in short, governmental bodies at all levels and
of all types make policy decisions that are subject to review pursuant to SEPA.
61. 84 Wn. 2d at 556, 527 P.2d at 112.
62. See note 53 and accompanying text supra. See also sources cited at note 51
supra. Note the confusion of the Leschi opinion as to which test was currently operat-
ing in Washington, note 53 supra. Since the court merely substituted one phrase
for the other long after its decision was handed down, the conclusion is almost ines-
capable that the court believed it made little difference to the holding which formula-
tion had been used.
420
Shorelines Management
hopes of the Model Act draftsmen), it matters little which is applied.
Which body's decision the appellate court is scrutinizing is important,
however. Since an appellate court, in order to reverse, must be left
with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the decision to
which the standard is applied will have the greatest chance of being
upheld. In Ballard Elks the court chose to give this benefit to the
agency rather than the lower court.63
B. Relationship of the Agencies Under the Clearly Erroneous Test
The decision of the Washington Supreme Court in Ballard Elks
startled and concerned both conservationists and administrators. The
former apparently believed the decision meant that the court ap-
proved unbridled construction on state shorelines and that this setback
might represent the commencement of an evisceration of the Act.64
DOE officials worried that the decision had seriously altered the deci-
sionmaking balance they had believed was embodied in the SMA. 65 In
reality, however, the decision does none of those things. It does con-
firm the belief that normal principles of administrative law will govern
implementation of the SMA. This result is not surprising, as the legis-
lature, in making the SMA subject to the WAPA, apparently intended
this result.
More telling is the court's oft-repeated insistence, when reviewing
adifiinistrative determinations, that Washington courts must not sub-
63. 84 Wn. 2d at 556, 527 P.2d at 1124. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
Although Ballard Elks should have settled the issue, one indication that it has not
exists. In Warmington v. Department of Employment Security, 12 Wn. App. 364, 529
P.2d 1142 (1974), Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals reviewed a superior
court reversal of an administrative decision that plaintiff was "regularly attending"
university classes and should thus be denied unemployment compensation. Writing for
the court, and citing Ballard Elks, Judge Charles Horowitz stated:
[The superior court judge] after reviewing the substantial evidence before him
on which he based his findings, appears to have been firmly convinced that a mis-
take had been committed by the acting commissioner even though there was evi-
dence supporting his decision or order. Department of Ecology v. Ballard Elks
Lodge No. 827, 84 Wn. 2d 551, 555, 527 P.2d 1121 (1974). We cannot find the
court exceeded his power by entering the judgment appealed.
Id. at 369-70, 529 P.2d at 1145 (emphasis added). Not long after writing the Warm-
ington opinion, Judge Horowitzjoined the state supreme court.
64. Interviews with Prof. Ralph W. Johnson, University of Washington School of
Law, in Seattle, January 1975.
65. Interview with Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General & Chief
Counsel, Washington State Department of Ecology, in Seattle, February 27, 1975.
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stitute their judgment for that of administrative bodies. 66 A judicial
preference for bodies that hold formal hearings in accord with proce-
dural safeguards and develop a record67 may also have been influen-
tial in the court's analysis. Conversely, it has been argued that courts
in general will more carefully scrutinize agency procedures that com-
bine investigatory, prosecutory, and adjudicatory powers in a single
body, 68 and this factor would militate against accepting the DOE's
position. 69
The court in Ballard Elks, having discussed the facts of the case,
analyzed the appropriate judicial review and administrative law prin-
ciples; and examined the policy of the SMA as applied by the Shore-
lines Hearings Board in the instant case, concluded that the Board's
decision was not clearly erroneous.70 Stated another way, the Shore-
lines Hearings Board, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal, con-
ducts the initial adjudication of a contested case; a reviewing trial
court must then accord due deference to the Board's decisional experi-
ence, and should not reverse the Board's decision unless it is clearly
66. See, e.g., Farm Supply Distribs. Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n,
83 Wn. 2d 446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974), see notes 56 & 59 and accompanying text
supra; Department of Ecology v. City of Kirkland, 84 Wn. 2d 25, 523 P.2d 1181
(1974); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166
(1973); Northern Pac. Transp. Co., v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wn.
2d 472, 418 P.2d 735 (1966); Herrett Trucking Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 61 Wn.
2d 234, 377 P.2d 871 (1963).
67. See DAVIS at 157-93; COOPER at 670-71.
68. COOPER at 671-72. See also Newbury v. Department of Public Assistance, 80
Wn. 2d 13, 491 P.2d 235 (1971). It should be noted, however, that Washington courts
have repeatedly sanctioned departmental reversals of hearing-examiner findings. See,
e.g., Farm Supply Distribs., Inc. v. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wn. 2d
446, 518 P.2d 1237 (1974); Warmington v. Department of Employment Security, 12
Wn. App. 364, 529 P.2d 1142 (1974). Note also that hearings could be obtained in
other forums, e.g., at the local level. SMA regulations suggest that local governments
may establish a mandatory or optional public hearing procedure to precede the issu-
ance or denial of substantial development permits. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-14-080
(1972).
69. See Part III supra. Possibly the SMA might have been drafted so that, even in
the face of inherent court preferences for an impartial tribunal, the result urged by
the DOE might have been reached. Procedures could have been established within the
DOE, for example, to develop a record and provide procedural safeguards in the
permit review process. Likewise, the Board's scope of review might have been pre-
scribed, so that it would have been required to accord weight to the views of the local
entity and the Department and, concomitantly, to defer to agreement between the
two. Under such a requirement, the Board could have been permitted to reverse such
permit decisions only where it found clear error. However, the Act was not so drafted,
nor should it have been, since the potential for bureaucratic abuse may be lessened by
the interposition of an impartial tribunal.
70. 84 Wn. 2d at 559, 527 P.2d at 1126.
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erroneous; the job of an appellate-level reviewing court is to deter-
mine whether it agrees with the superior court that the agency deter-
mination was or was not clearly erroneous. This is a normal, unre-
markable administrative structure, with an agency determining the
policy and overseeing its execution, and an impartial tribunal avail-
able to hear those aggrieved by either the policy or its application.
V. CONCLUSION
Little clarification of shoreline policy follows as a result of the Bal-
lard Elks' decision. Delineation of water-dependent uses, whether the
Shorelines Hearings Board recognizes a "line of conformity" (at least
in the area in question), how "public access" should be defined, what
constitutes a "natural" shoreline, and how much construction over the
water is "minimal" all remain to be determined. Following Ballard
Elks, however, the forum in which these issues are joined will almost
certainly be the Shorelines Hearings Board rather than the courts.
The court's exposition of the administrative structure of the Shore-
line Management Act may serve to strengthen the Act, as it places
responsibility for adjudication in a state body, rather than in an eva-
nescent coalition between the Department of Ecology and those local
entities that agree with the DOE at any given time. Ironically, adop-
tion of the view of the DOE would have further decentralized power
over state shorelines, while adoption of the position urged by the po-
tential developer, a figurative representative of a group that usually
favors local (or no) control, has strengthened the state's hand and
71. It might be argued that Ballard Elks has, in fact, made a statement about the
Washington court's position on shoreline development, citing the court's discussion of
the Board's policy considerations. It is true that the court did not find the Board's in-
terpretation repugnant to any judicial analysis of the law. Yet, as cited by the court,
the factual considerations used by the Board to support its decision were nonspecific
and noncontroversial, and provided no generally applicable standards. Rather, the
court's interpretation of the environmental issues presented was attuned more to the
equities of the situation than to the future direction of state shorelines policy.
Policy considerations were exhaustively briefed by all parties, and could have been
analyzed in depth in the opinion. However, the only substantive issue explicitly de-
cided by the court was that the SMA does not prohibit development on state shore-
lines. It might also be noted that the decision is carefully confined to its facts, a factor
not conducive to broader policymaking. See notes 36 & 37 and accompanying text
supra. Furthermore, the relationships established by Ballard Elks could shift follow-
ing the adoption of SMA-mandated master plans, which will help evaluate the ac-
ceptability of proposed developments.
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turned the SMA in the direction originally urged by the Washington
Environmental Council.72 As the DOE pointed out, the precedential
value of Shorelines Hearings Board decisions was already signifi-
cant7 3 The Ballard Elks opinion, making the Board in effect the final
arbiter of the permit procedure, will tend to increase the impact of
Board decisions.
Glenna Spitzer Hall
72. See note 13 supra.
73. Brief for Respondents at 13.
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